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Abstract
Given two finite ordered sets A = {a1, . . . , am} and B = {b1, . . . , bn}, introduce the set of mn outcomes
of the game O = {(a, b) | a ∈ A, b ∈ B} = {(ai, bj) | i ∈ I = {1, . . . ,m}, j ∈ J = {1, . . . , n}. Two players,
Alice and Bob, have the sets of strategies X and Y that consist of all monotone non-decreasing mappings
x : A → B and y : B → A, respectively. It is easily seen that each pair (x, y) ∈ X × Y produces at least
one deal, that is, an outcome (a, b) ∈ O such that x(a) = b and y(b) = a. Denote by G(x, y) ⊆ O the set of
all such deals related to (x, y). The obtained mapping G = Gm,n : X × Y → 2O is a game correspondence.
Choose an arbitrary deal g(x, y) ∈ G(x, y) to obtain a mapping g : X × Y → O, which is a game form. We
use notation g ∈ G and show that each such game form is tight and, hence, Nash-solvable, that is, for any
pair u = (uA, uB) of utility functions uA : O → R of Alice and uB : O → R of Bob, the obtained monotone
bargaining game (g, u) has at least one Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. Moreover, the same equilibrium
can be selected for all g ∈ G. We also obtain an efficient algorithm that determines such an equilibrium in
time linear in mn, although the numbers of strategies |X | =
(
m+n−1
m
)
and |Y | =
(
m+n−1
n
)
are exponential
in mn. Our results show that, somewhat surprising, the players have no need to hide or randomize their
bargaining strategies, even in the zero-sum case.
Key words: Monotone bargaining game, deal, game form, game correspondence, Nash equilibrium, Nash-
solvability, tightness.
1 Introduction
1.1 Main results
Two players, Alice and Bob, possess items A = {a1, . . . , am} and B = {b1, . . . , bn}, respectively. Both sets are
ordered: the smaller is the index, the less valuable is the corresponding item. Both players know both orders.
A pair (a, b) with a ∈ A and b ∈ B is called an outcome.
Alice chooses her strategy, which is a mappings x : A → B, showing that she is ready to exchange a for
x(a) for any a ∈ A. Naturally, such a mapping x is assumed to be monotone non-decreasing: x(a) ≥ x(a′)
whenever a > a′. Similarly, Bob chooses his strategy, which is a monotone non-decreasing mapping y : B → A.
It is not difficult to compute the cardinalities of the sets of strategies and outcomes:
|X| =
(
m+ n− 1
m
)
, |Y | =
(
m+ n− 1
n
)
; |O| = mn. (1)
Let us fix a pair of strategies (x, y). An outcome (a, b) ∈ O is called a deal if x(a) = b and y(b) = a. Denote
by G(x, y) ⊆ O the set of all deals. We will show that set G(x, y) is not empty; yet, it may contain several
deals. The obtained mapping G : X × Y → 2O is called a (monotone bargaining) game correspondence. Note
that G = Gm,n is uniquely defined by m and n. For each (x, y), let us fix an arbitrary deal g(x, y) from G(x, y).
The obtained a mapping g : X × Y → O, is called a (monotone bargaining) game form.
An arbitrary (not necessarily monotone bargaining) two-person game form g is called Nash-solvable (NS)
if for any pair u = (uA, uB) of utility functions uA : O → R of Alice and uB : O → R of Bob the obtained
game (g, u) has at least one Nash equilibrium (NE) in pure strategies. A game correspondence G is called NS
if every its game form g ∈ G is NS.
We will apply some general criteria of Nash-solvability (based on the concept of Boolean duality and
developed for the two-person game forms and correspondences in [13], [15], [27]) to the monotone bargaining
case considered in this paper. These criteria imply that G = Gm,n is NS for all m and n. Moreover, given m
and n, the same NE (x, y) exists for all g ∈ G, and this equilibrium is simple, that is, G(x, y) contains a unique
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deal. We also construct an efficient algorithm that determines such an equilibrium in time polynomial in mn,
although, by (1), the sizes of X and Y are exponential in mn.
In our model, Alice and Bob are restricted to their monotone non-decreasing strategies. Let us replace them
by the monotone non-increasing ones. Obviously, this case is equivalent with the original one: it is enough
just to inverse the enumeration of either A, or B, but not both. However, if we restrict Alice by her monotone
non-decreasing and Bob by his monotone non-increasing) strategies, or vice versa, then G(x, y) may become
empty for some x and y.
In particular, our results imply that the players have no need to keep their bargaining strategies secret and
choose them randomly, even in the zero-sum case. This is unusual, since in most bargaining models players do
have to hide and randomize their strategies [5], [22], [23], [25], [26], [7].
The considered monotone bargaining games can be viewed as positional games on complete bipartite di-
graphs, in which, however, both players are restricted to their monotone non-decreasing (or equivalently,
non-increasing) strategies. Restricting the set of strategies can be viewed as a generalization of the concept of
imperfect information [14, Section 6]. Nevertheless, we show that the monotone bargaining games can be solved
in pure strategies. It would be interesting to find other classes of positional games with imperfect information
NS in pure strategies.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we derive some combinatorial properties of a monotone
bargaining game correspondence G = Gm,n and then explain their role and meaning, after recalling some
general definitions and results related to the two-person normal form games in Section 3. In particular, we
show that G, as well as all game forms g ∈ G, are tight. Moreover, they have the same pair of dual hypergraphs
(or the same self-dual effectivity functions, in terminology of [16] and [17]). It is known that tightness and
Nash-solvability are equivalent properties of the two-person game forms; see [13], [15], and also [27]. In Section
3.3 we recall a constructive proof of this fact that is based on an algorithm finding a NE in any game (g, u) in
time linear in the size of the set O of its outcomes, whenever g is tight. Recall that |O| = mn for the monotone
bargaining game forms. In section 4 we recall other classes of two-person tight game forms that appear from:
positional structures, Section 4.1; self-dual hypergraphs, Section 4.2); symmetric dual hypergraphs and veto
voting, Section 4.3; topological structure, where tightness results from Jordan’s curve theorem, Section 4.4.
Finally, in Section 5 we show that a natural extension of our results to the case of three players fails.
1.2 Examples
Three game correspondences G = Gm,n are shown in Figures 1, 2, and 3 for (m = n = 2), (m = 3, n = 2), and
(m = n = 3) respectively. The corresponding tables are of sizes 3 × 3, 4 × 6, and 10 × 10, respectively, and
contain 4, 6, and 9 outcomes, in accordance with (1).
Each of these three figures consists of two tables. In the first one, items a ∈ A and b ∈ B are represented
as the vertices of a bipartite digraph, denoted by white and black discs that are always located on the left and
on the right, respectively. The values of items increase with their indices i ∈ I and j ∈ J , the higher is a disc,
the smaller is its index and the cheaper is the corresponding item. The strategies (monotone non-decreasing
mappings) x and y are denoted by directed arcs, which may have common ends, but no other intersections.
Indeed, they cannot have a common beginning, because x : A → B and y : B → A are mappings, and since
both mappings are monotone non-decreasing, the arcs cannot cross. The strategies and deals are shown on the
corresponding bipartite graphs; To save space, for every i ∈ I and j ∈ J we denote the deal oij = (ai, bj) by
a non-directed arc between ai and bj . In the second table the strategies and deals are specified simply by the
corresponding pairs of indices (i, j).
Rows and columns of both tables are labeled by the strategies x ∈ X and y ∈ Y , respectively. The set of
deals G(x, y is shown for each entry (x, y). These sets are always non-empty (see Proposition 2 below) but
may contain several deals. For example, in Figure 3, three deals {ai, bi} | i = 1, 2, 3} are assigned to the pair
(x, y) with x(ai) = bi and y(bi) = ai for i = 1, 2, 3; and one or two deals are assigned to any other pair (x, y).
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Figure 1. Monotone bargaining game correspondence G(2, 2).
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Figure 2. Monotone bargaining game correspondence G(2, 3).
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Figure 3. Monotone bargaining game correspondence G(3, 3).
For each of the three examples let us verify also the following combinatorial properties, which will play an
important role too:
• (r) For any deal (a, b) ∈ G(x, y) there exist x′ ∈ X and y′ ∈ Y such that sets G(x, y′) and G(x′, y) contain
only this deal (a, b).
• In each row x ∈ X (respectively, column y ∈ Y ) choose an arbitrary deal (a, b) ∈ G(x, y) for some y ∈ Y
(respectively, for some x ∈ X). Then,
• (t) The obtained two selections always have a deal in common.
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• (t′ t′′) There exists a column y0 (respectively, a row x0) such that the set of deals in it is a subset of the
above row-selection (respectively, column-selection).
Let us consider, for example, the 3 × 3 table in Figure 1. The central entry G(x2, y2) contains two deals
(a1, b1) and (a2, b2), but the second row and the second column each contains (a1, b1) and (a2, b2), separately,
in G(x1, y2), G(x2, y1) and in G(x2, y3), G(x3, y2). Thus, (r) holds for this table. In the same table, the side
diagonal is a row selection that provides the set of deals (a2, b1), (a1, b1), (a1, b2)}, but the first column provides
(a1, b1), (a1, b2)}, which is its subset. Similarly, in the 10 × 10 table in Figure 3 the entry G(x5, y5) contains
three deals (a1, b1), (a2, b2), and (a3, b3), but each of these three deals appears in the fifth row and column of
this table separately, in agreement with (r).
In Sections 3 and 4 we will recall that properties (t′), (t′′) and (t) are equivalent and imply (r). Due to (r),
all game forms g ∈ G have the same pair of hypergraphs (or in other words, the same effectivity functions).
Furthermore, (t′), (t′′) and (t) mean that these hypergraphs are dual (respectively, the effectivity function is
self-dual) implying that all game forms g ∈ G are tight and, hence, Nash-solvable, in accordance with the
criteria of [13] and [15].
1.3 Interpretation
Let Alice and Bob be dealers possessing the sets of objects A and B, respectively, and a deal (a, b) ∈ A × B
means that they exchange a and b. They may be art-dealers, car dealers; or one of them may be just a buyer
with a discrete budget.
It would be natural to order sets A and B in accordance with the values of the objects. This fully justifies
the requirement of monotonicity for the strategies x ∈ X and y ∈ Y . Yet, then, it is not natural to assume
that the utility functions uA and uB are arbitrary. Indeed, for a pair of deals (a, b) and (a
′, b′) such that
a ≤ a′, b′ ≤ b and at least one of these inequalities is strict, it would be natural to assume that Alice strictly
prefers (a, b) to (a′, b′), while Bob vice versa. Under such assumption, two constant strategies x : a → bn and
y : b → am form a trivial NE with the outcome (am, bn). Although, we prove that an equilibrium exists for
any uA and uB (which is non-trivial) but why to consider any?
However, it becomes natural if the values of the deals can be corrected by side-payments. Then, let us also
require that the total value of each collection, A and B, should not be reduced. These total values are estimated
subjectively by Alice and Bob (or by some experts) and the side-payments are not taken into account. Such a
requirement would suffice to eliminate all strategies except for the monotone non-decreasing ones.
Alternatively, A and B are ordered in accordance with some other attribute of the objects, distinct from
their commercial value. Such an attribute must be important enough to justify the requirement of monotonicity
of the strategies. For example, it could be the shelf life of commodities, or the age of pieces of art. (The age
is also a reasonable attribute in case of the matching problems, when A and B are brides and grooms, and a
deal is a marriage.) We leave to the reader suggesting more practical cases when x and y must be monotone
non-decreasing, while u can be arbitrary.
2 Main properties of monotone bargaining
To any pair of strategies x : A→ B and y : B → A (not necessarily monotone non-decreasing) let us assign a
digraph Γ = Γ(x, y) on the vertex-set A ∪B as follows: (a, b) (respectively, (b, a) is an arc of Γ(x, y) whenever
x(a) = b (respectively, y(b) = a).
Some visualization helps. Let us consider an embedding of Γ(x, y) into the plane, as in Figures 1, 2, and
3, where many (3 × 3 + 4 × 6 + 10 × 10 = 133) examples are given. Obviously, no two arcs corresponding to
x may have a common tail, but may have common heads. Furthermore, for a monotone non-decreasing x the
corresponding arcs cannot cross. The same is true for y. However, two arcs corresponding to x and to y may
cross; also the head of one may coincide with the tail of the other.
Remark 1 In contrast, for a monotone non-increasing mapping, every two of its arcs intersect: either cross or
have common heads. Indeed, one turns a monotone non-decreasing mapping x (respectively, y) into a monotone
non-increasing one x′ (respectively, y′) just replacing the order of B (respectively, of A) by the inverse one.
By construction, digraph Γ is bipartite, with parts A and B. Hence, every directed cycle (dicycle) in Γ is
even. There is an obvious one-to-one correspondence between the dicycles of length 2 (or 2-dicycles, for short)
in Γ(x, y) and the deals of G(x, y). In the figures all 2-dicycles are replaced by the nondirected edges.
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Proposition 1 Digraph Γ(x, y) contains at least one dicycle of length 2 and no longer dicycles.
Proof. For any initial vertex v ∈ A ∪ B, strategies x and y uniquely define an infinite walk from v. Since
sets A and B are finite, this walk is a lasso, that is, it consists of an initial directed path and a dicycle C
repeated infinitely. Furthermore, C is a 2-dicycle whenever mappings x and y are monotone non-decreasing.
Indeed, it is easily seen that either x, or y, or both are not monotone whenever C is longer, since in this case
crossing arcs corresponding either to x or to y must appear. 
The next statement results immediately from Proposition 1.
Proposition 2 Game correspondence G is well-defined, that is, G(x, y) 6= ∅ for all monotone non-decreasing
x ∈ X and y ∈ Y . 
As Figures 1, 2, and 3 show, G(x, y) may contain several deals. These deals can be naturally ordered in
accordance with their importance, as the following claim shows.
Proposition 3 For any two deals (a, b), (a′, b′) ∈ G(x, y) we have: either a > a′ and b > b′, or a < a′ and
b < b′.
Proof. Indeed, equalities a = a′ or b = b′ cannot hold, because any two arcs corresponding to a mapping
cannot have a common tail. Also they cannot cross whenever the considered mapping is monotone non-
decreasing. The above two observations imply the statement. 
Proposition 4 Any set of pairwise disjoint (nondirected) edges between A and B may form G(x, y) for some
monotone non-decreasing x and y.
Proof. Consider any k deals (ai1 , bj1 , . . . , aik , bjk such that ai1 < . . . < aik and bj1 < . . . < bjk . Define
x(a) = bjt for all a such that ait−1 < a ≤ ait and x(b) = ait for all b such that bjt−1 < b ≤ bjt , where
the first inequalities are redundant for t = 1. By construction, x and y are monotone non-decreasing and
G(x, y) = {(ai1 , bj1 , . . . , aik , bjk}. 
The remaining claims of this subsection we formulate and prove for Alice. Of course, similar statements and
proofs hold for Bob as well: just replace x,X, a,A, i, I, ”row”, ”Alice”, and ”she” with y, Y, b,B, j, J, ”column”,
”Bob”, and ”he”, respectively, and vice versa.
Proposition 5 Any set of pairwise disjoint (nondirected) edges between A and B corresponding to a monotone
non-decreasing x forms G(x, y) for some y.
Proof. Define (a monotone non-decreasing) mapping y as in the proof of Proposition 4. 
Choosing a game form g ∈ G we select one deal for each pair (x, y). The following statement implies that,
in a sense, this choice does not matter.
Proposition 6 For any deal (a, b) ∈ G(x, y) there exists a strategy x′ ∈ X such that G(x′, y) consists of a
unique deal {(a, b)}.
Proof. Obviously, the constant mappings x′ : A→ {b} satisfies the condition and proves the statement. 
Given a subset of outcomes W ⊆ O and a game correspondence G : X × Y → 2O (respectively, a game
form g : X × Y → O) we say that Alice is effective for W if she has a strategy x ∈ X such that G(x, y) ⊆ W
(respectively, g(x, y) ∈W ) for any y ∈ Y ; or in other words, if there is a row x in which all outcomes are from
W . We write E(A,W ) = 1 in this case and E(A,W ) = 0 otherwise.
For each W ⊆ O, the following simple greedy algorithm verifies in time linear in |O| = mn whether
Alice is effective for W , that is, if E(A,W ) = 1. For each ai ∈ A, i ∈ I = {1, . . . ,m}, select the minimal
bji ∈ B, ji ∈ J = {1, . . . , n}, if any, such that (ai, bji) ∈ W and bji ≥ bji−1 . (The last condition is redundant
for i = 1.) If such bji exists for each i ∈ I then stop and output E(B,W ) = 1. In this case x : A → B such
that x(ai) = bji for all i ∈ I as a required strategy; furthermore, by construction, x is the lexicographically
minimal monotone non-decreasing one. If bji fails to exist for some i ∈ I then stop and output E(A,W ) = 0.
However, the last option is impossible when each column contains an outcome from W .
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Theorem 1 Given G : X × Y → 2O and W ⊆ O, if for each y ∈ Y there exists an x ∈ X such that
W ∩G(x, y) 6= ∅ then there exists an x ∈ X such that G(x, y) ⊆W for each y ∈ Y .
This claim can be equivalently reformulated in many ways; for example, E(B,O\W ) = 0 ⇒ E(A,W ) = 1;
see Section 3 for more options.
Proof of the theorem. We apply the greedy algorithm verifying that for each i = 1, . . . ,m a required bji
exists for ai.
First, let us consider the following simple case, just as an example. Suppose that (a1, b2), (a2, b1) ∈W , while
(a1, b1) 6∈ W and (a2, bj) 6∈ W for all j = 2, . . . , n. Then, E(A,W ) = 0, since bi2 does not exist. However, in
this case W cannot satisfy the conditions of the theorem. Indeed, let us consider a (monotone non-decreasing)
strategy y ∈ Y such that y(b1) = a1 and y(bj) = a2 for all j = 2, . . . , n. Then, either (a1, b1) ∈ W or
(a2, bj) ∈ W for at least one j = 2, . . . , n. Thus, G(x, y) ∩ W = ∅ for all x ∈ X, which contradicts the
requirements to W .
The general case can be analyzed similarly. Suppose that the greedy algorithm assigns bji to ai for i =
1, . . . , k, for some k < m, but for ak+1 there exists no b = bjk+1 satisfying the required conditions: (l)
(ak+1, b) ∈W and (ll) b ≥ bjk , that is, either (l), or (ll), or both fail for every b. In each case we will construct a
strategy y ∈ Y that violate conditions of the theorem. When (l) fails, it is enough to take the constant mapping
y that assigns b to every a ∈ A. When (ll) fails, y is chosen in a more sophisticated way. Recursively, for
j = 1, . . . , k, assign to each bj ∈ B the minimal aij ∈ A such that (aij , bj) 6∈ W and aij > aij−1 . In particular,
aij = ak+1 for all j ≥ jk.
By construction, y is a monotone non-decreasing mapping such that W ∩G(x, y) = ∅ for all x ∈ X, which
contradicts conditions of the theorem. 
3 Tightness and Nash-solvability
3.1 Dual hypergraphs
Given a ground-set O = {o1, . . . , op}, consider two hypergraphs
C = {Cx | x ∈ X} and D = {Dy | 2
Y } ⊆ 2O.
HereX,Y, andO are arbitrary finite sets. However, later they will be interpreted as strategies and outcomes,
as in Sections 1 and 2. For this reason we keep the notation. Consider the following properties of C and D:
• (i) Cx ∩Dy 6= ∅ for all x ∈ X and y ∈ Y ;
• (t′) For any D′ ⊆ O such that D′ ∩ Cx 6= ∅ for each x ∈ X there exists an y ∈ Y such that Dy ⊆ D
′;
• (t′′) For any C ′ ⊆ O such that C ′ ∩Dy 6= ∅ for each y ∈ Y there exists an x ∈ X such that Cx ⊆ C
′;
• (t) C ′ ∩D′ 6= ∅ whenever C ′ ∩Dy 6= ∅ for each y ∈ Y and D
′ ∩Cx 6= ∅ for each x ∈ X;
• (r) For any x ∈ X, y ∈ Y and o ∈ Cx ∩ Dy there exist an x
′ ∈ X and y′ ∈ Y such that Cx′ ∩ Dy =
Cx ∩Dy′ = {o}.
Theorem 2 The following implications hold:
((i) & (t))⇔ ((i) & (t′))⇔ ((i) & (t′′))⇒ (r). (2)
Hypergraphs C and D satisfying the first three equivalent properties are called dual. Note that ((i) & (r))
does not imply duality yet.
The last implication of Theorem 2 is obvious and all are well-known; see, for example, [4, Part I Section
4.2], where the above properties are formulated in the Boolean language, in terms of the monotone (positive)
Conjunctive and Disjunctive Normal Forms; see also [13], [15]. We leave to the reader to verify all implication
of Theorem 2.
It is also well-known [4] that duality of C,D ⊆ 2O is respected by any identification of the elements of O.
Let us fix a subset O′ ⊆ O such that |O′| > 1 and replace all o ∈ O′ by one new element o′. This operation
turns C and D into C′ and D′ , which remain dual whenever C and D were dual. Clearly, such operation can
be applied successively several times.
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Remark 2 A hypergraph is called Sperner if its edges do not contain one another and, in particular, cannot
be equal. Sperner hypergraphs are associated with the irredundant monotone Conjunctive and Disjunctive
Normal Forms [4]. For any hypergraph C (respectively, D) properties (i) and (t′) (respectively, (i) and t′′))
uniquely determine the so-called dual hypergraph Cd (respectively, Dd), which is Sperner, by the definition. If
C (respectively, D) is Sperner itself then duality is an involution, that is, Cdd = C (respectively, Ddd = D).
Although in all our examples only dual pairs of Sperner hypergraphs appear, but we do not assume that this
always holds; in particular, we allow hypergraphs to have embedded or equal edges.
3.2 Tight game correspondences and game forms
Now, we interpret X,Y and O as the sets strategies and outcomes. A mapping G : X × Y → 2O assigning
a set of outcomes to each pair of strategies is called a game correspondence. A mapping g : X × Y → O
assigning a single outcome of O to each pair (x, y) is called a game form. We will call G′ : X × Y → 2O a
subcorrespondence of G and write G′ ≤ G if G′(x, y) ⊆ G(x, y) for each x ∈ X and y ∈ Y . If G′ = g is a game
form, we call it a subform of G and write g ∈ G. All these concepts were already considered in Sections 1 and
2 in the special case of monotone bargaining; here we extend them to the general case.
To each game correspondence G : X × Y → 2O we assign two hypergraphs
C = {Cx =
⋃
y∈Y
G(x, y) | x ∈ X}, D = {Dy =
⋃
x∈X
G(x, y) | y ∈ Y } ⊆ 2Oand
and call G tight if they are dual. Note that G(x, y) ⊆ Cx∩Dy for every x ∈ X, y ∈ Y , by definition, and hence,
property (i) holds for C and D automatically, since G(x, y) 6= ∅.
Game correspondences G1, G2, G3, G4 in Figures 1–4 have the following four pairs of hypergraphs:
C1 = {(o11, o21), (o11, o22), (o12, o22)},
D1 = {(o11, o12), (o11, o22), (o21, o22)};
C2 = {(o11, o21, o31), (o11, o21, o32), (o11, o22, o32), (o12, o22, o32)},
D2 = {(o11, o12), (o11, o22), (o11, o32), (o21, o22), (o21, o32), (o31, o32)};
C3 = {(o11, o21, o31), (o11, o21, o32), (o11, o21, o33), (o11, o22, o32), (o11, o22, o33),
(o11, o23, o33), (o12, o22, o32), (o12, o22, o33), (o12, o23, o33), (o13, o23, o33)},
D3 = {(o11, o12, o13), (o11, o12, o23), (o11, o12, o33), (o11, o22, o23), (o11, o22, o33),
(o11, o32, o33), (o21, o22, o23), (o21, o22, o33), (o21, o32, o33), (o31, o32, o33)};
C5 = D5 = {(o0, o1, o6), (o0, o2, o5)(o0, o3, o4), (o1, o2, o4), (o1, o3, o5), (o2, o3, o6), (o4, o5, o6)};
C6 = D6 =Wk = {(o0, o1), (o0, o2), . . . , (o0, ok), (o1, o2, . . . , ok)} for k = 3;
C7 = {(o1, o2, o3), (o1, o2, o4), (o1, o3, o4), (o2, o3, o4)};
D7 = {(o1, o2), (o1, o3), (o1, o4), (o2, o3), (o2, o4), (o3, o4)};
C8 = {(o1, o2), (o3, o4), (o1, o4, o5), (o2, o3, o5)},
D8 = {(o1, o3), (o2, o4), (o1, o4, o5), (o2, o3, o5)}.
We leave to the careful reader to
• (j) verify that each pair contains two dual (Sperner) hypergraphs, or in other words, that the eight game
correspondences in Figures 1–8 are tight;
• (jj) reformulate all statements of Section 3.1 related to tightness for game correspondences and forms;
• (jjj) check that some of them were proven in Section 2 for the case of monotone bargaining.
Proposition 7 If G′ ≤ G then G′ is tight whenever G is tight; moreover, in this case G and G′ have the same
pair of dual hypergraphs.
Note that the inverse implication fails. For example, G(x, y) = O may hold for all x ∈ X and y ∈ Y , in
which case G is not tight unless |X| = 1 or |Y | = 1 or |O| = 1, while G′ may be tight. Note also that G′ may
be a game form.
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Proof of Proposition 7. If G is tight then property (r) holds. implying that G and G′ generate the same
pairs of hypergraphs. 
Any two hypergraphs C and D on the ground-set O uniquely define the game correspondence G = GC,D by
formula G(x, y) = Cx ∩Dy. By definition, G is tight if and only if C and D are dual. By Proposition 7, in this
case every subcorrespondence G′ ≤ G and, in particular, each game form g ∈ G is tight too; also tightness is
preserved by any identifications of the outcomes, as we already mentioned. Note finally that hypergraphs C
and D need not to be Sperner: each of them may contain embedded and multiple edges.
3.3 Nash-solvability
To a game form g : X × Y → O, we assign a (normal form) game (g, u) introducing the utility function
u = (uA, uB) for the players: uA : O → R for Alice and uB : O → R for Bob. A strategy profile (x, y) ∈ X × Y
of a game (g, u) is called a Nash equilibrium (NE) if
uA(g(x
′, y) ≤ uA(g(x, y) for all x
′ ∈ X; uB(g(x, y
′) ≤ uA(g(x, y) for all y
′ ∈ Y .
A game (g, u) and its utility function u = (uA, uB) are called zero-sum if uA(o)+uB(o) = 0 for each o ∈ O.
In this case a Nash equilibrium is usually referred to as a saddle point. A game form g is called
• Nash-solvable (NS) if game (g, u) has a Nash equilibrium (NE) for any u;
• zero-sum-solvable if (g, u) has a saddle point for every zero-sum u;
• ±1-solvable if (g, u) has a saddle point for every zero-sum u taking values +1 and −1 only.
Theorem 3 ([13], [15]). The following properties of game forms ar equivalent: (S1) NS, (S2) zero-sum-
solvability, (S3) ±1-solvability, (T) tightness.
Implications (S1)⇒ (S2)⇒ (S3) are immediate from the definitions.
For the zero-sum case, the equivalence (T )⇔ (S2)⇔ (S3) was proven by Edmonds and Fulkerson (who called
it the “Bottle-Neck Extrema Theorem”) in [6] and later, independently, in [12]. Then, NS (and the implication
(T ) ⇒ (S1)) was added to the list in [13]. The same proof was repeated in a more focused paper [15]. This
proof is constructive: a NE in the game (g, u) is obtained by an explicit algorithm whenever the game form g
is tight. Unfortunately, this algorithm is exponential in the size of O.
Another proof, based on a polynomial algorithm, appeared later; see [16, Section 4.3] and [2, Section 3].
Some new ideas from [1] and [5] were used in this proof. Here, for reader’s convenience, we reproduce it in a
stronger and slightly simplified form.
Proof of the implication (T )⇒ (S1). We will prove a stronger claim. Given a tight game correspondence
G : X × Y → 2O and an arbitrary utility function u = (uA, uB), we suggest an algorithm that finds a simple
NE ((x, y) such that |G(x, y)| = 1) in time linear in |O|.
Let us recall notation. Given a subset of outcomes W ⊆ O, we say that Alice is effective for W if she has
a strategy x ∈ X such that G(x, y) ⊆ W for any y ∈ Y ; or in other words, if there is a row x in which all
outcomes are from W , that is, if Cx ⊆ W . We write E(A,W ) = 1 in this case and E(A,W ) = 0 otherwise.
The effectivity function E(B,W ) of Bob is introduced similarly.
Obviously, the equalities E(A,W ) = E(B,O \W ) = 1 for no W ⊆ O can hold simultaneously. Indeed, if
Alice is effective for W and Bob for O \W then ∅ = G(x, y) ⊆ Cx ∩Dy for the corresponding strategies x ∈ X
and y ∈ Y , but G(x, y) cannot be empty. Thus, implication E(A,W ) = 1 ⇒ E(B,O \W ) = 0 holds for any
G and, by definition, G is tight if and only if the inverse implication holds: E(A,W ) = 0⇒ E(B,O \W ) = 1.
Consider partition O =W ∪WA ∪WB satisfying the following properties:
• (a1) any outcome of WA is not better for Alice than any outcome of W , that is, uA(o
′) ≤ uA(o) for any
o ∈W and o′ ∈WA;
• (b1) any outcome of WB is not better for Bob than any outcome of W , that is, uB(o
′) ≤ uB(o) for any
o ∈W and o′ ∈WB ;
• (a2) E(A,WB) = 0, that is, Alice cannot punish Bob;
• (b2) E(B,WA) = 0, that is, Bob cannot punish Allice.
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Our arguments will be based on a dynamical process. We begin with W = O and then reduce W sending
outcomes to WA and to WB. First, let us show that W cannot be eliminated completely. Indeed, suppose
that W = ∅ and, hence, O = WA ∪ WB is a partition. Then, (a2), (b2), and tightness of G imply that
E(A,WB) = E(B,WA) = 1, which is impossible, as we already mentioned. Thus, the dynamical process of
reducing W will get stuck at some point, say, at a partition O =W ∪WA ∪WB .
Let o∗ ∈ O be the worst outcome in W for Alice, that is, uA(o
∗) ≤ uA(o) for each o ∈ W . We would
like to move o∗ from W to WA but cannot. The only possible reason is that (b2) will be violated, that is,
E(B,WA ∪ {o
∗}) = 1. Denote by y∗ a strategy of Bob that is effective for (WA ∪ {o
∗}).
Moving o∗ alone from to W to WB may violate (b1). To keep it, we have to add to o
∗ all outcomes
WB(o
∗) ⊆ W that are not better than o∗ for Bob, that is, uB(o
∗) ≥ uB(o) for all o ∈ WB(o
∗); in particular,
o∗ ∈ WB(o
∗). Then, moving WB(o
∗) from W to WB is OK with (b1), but still cannot be done. The only
possible reason is that (a2) is violated, that is, E(A,WB ∪WB(o
∗)) = 1. Denote by x∗ a strategy of Alice that
is effective for (WB ∪WB(o
∗)).
By construction, G(x∗, y∗) = (WA ∪ {o
∗}) ∩ (WB ∪WB(o
∗)) = {o∗}. and (x∗, y∗) is a NE, moreover, it is
simple, since G(x∗, y∗) consists of the single outcome o∗. 
4 More classes of tight game forms
A criterion of tightness for the game forms associated with veto voting schemes can be found in the textbooks
[21, Chapter 6] or [24, Chapter 6]; see also [8, 19]. It can be reformulated as a criterion of duality for the
monotone (positive) threshold Boolean functions [4, Part II Chapter 9].
Here we will recall five more classes of tight game forms, whose NS follows in all cases from Theorem 3,
but sometimes can be shown simpler.
4.1 Positional game structures
Let Γ = (V,E) be a digraph whose vertices and arcs are interpreted as positions and moves, respectively.
Furthermore, let VA and VB be positions of positive out-degree, controlled by Alice and Bob, respectively,
while VT be the set of terminal positions, of out-degree zero. We assume that V = VA ∪ VB ∪VT is a partition.
A strategy x ∈ X of Alice (resp., y ∈ Y of Bob) is a mapping that assigns to each position v ∈ VA (resp.,
v ∈ VB) an arbitrary move from this position. An initial position v0 ∈ VA ∪ VB and a pair (x, y) of strategies
uniquely define a walk that begins and v0 and then follows the decisions made by x and y. In theory of
positional games this walk is called a play. Each play either terminates in VT or it is infinite; in the latter case,
it must form a lasso: first, an initial path and then a dicycle repeated infinitely.
Positional structures defined above can also be represent in normal form. We will introduce a game form
g : X × Y → O, where standardly O denotes a set of outcomes. There are several ways to introduce this set.
One is to identify all infinite plays and consider them as a single outcome c; then O = VT ∪ {c}. Such games
were introduced by Washburn [31] who called them deterministic graphical (DG) games. In this case, for any
positional structure the associated game form is tight ([2, Section 3]; see also [3, Section 12]) and, hence, it is
also NS, as we know).
The following generalization was suggested recently in [18]. Digraph Γ is called strongly connected if for
any v, v′ ∈ V there is a directed path from v to v′ (and, hence, from v′ to v, as well). By this definition,
the union of two strongly connected digraphs is strongly connected whenever they have a common vertex. A
vertex-inclusion-maximal strongly connected induced subgraph of Γ is called its strongly connected component.
Obviously, any digraph Γ = (V,E) admits a unique decomposition into such components: Γj = Γ[V j] =
(V j, Ej) for j ∈ J , where J is a set of indices; furthermore V = ∪j∈JV
j is a partition of V . It can be
determined in time linear in the size of Γ (that is, in (|V |+ |E|)) and has numerous applications; see [30] and
[29] for more details.
One more application, to positional games was suggested in [18]. For each j ∈ J , let us contract Γj into a
single vertex vj . Then, all edges of Ej (in particular, the loops) disappear and we obtain an acyclic digraph
Γ∗ = (V ∗, E∗).
In the DG games, all infinite plays (lassos) represent a unique outcome c. In [18], the following weaker
assumption was considered. Two plays are equivalent, and represent the same outcome, when the directed
cycles of their lassos are contained in the same strongly connected component of Γ. Thus, J becomes the set
of outcomes. Such games were called deterministic graphical multi-stage (DGMS). In this case too, for any
positional structure, the associated game form is tight [18]. This result DGMS games strengthens the similar
one for the DG games, because merging outcomes, obviously, respects tightness and NS.
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Every strongly connected component Γj can be interpreted as a diplomatic issue. (The level may be not very
high; see examples in [18]). If this issue is resolved, the play leaves Γj , enters another component, and the parties
(players) proceed with the negotiation process. Otherwise, the play cycles in Γj and negotiations terminate
resulting in the outcome cj . It only matters at what issue Γ
j the parties have been forced into an impasse,
while details (a particular lasso, or a directed cycle in which it ends in Γj) are irrelevant. Thus, a DGMS game
is interpreted as a multistage diplomatic negotiations. The main result shows that the corresponding DGMS
game form is NS; furthermore, for any payoff a NE in the obtained game can be found in linear time, in other
words, any bilateral multistage diplomatic conflict can be efficiently resolved and the resolving strategies can
be efficiently determined.
One can also treat each dicycle of Γ as a separate outcome; then, O = VT ∪C(Γ). In this case, not all but
only some special game forms are tight. Their characterization is not known, in general, but the problem is
solved for the symmetric game structures, that is, assuming that (v′, v) ∈ E whenever (v, v′) ∈ E. First, tight
game forms of the symmetric bipartite game structures were characterized in [9], [10], and [11]. Then, in [3]
this result was strengthened by waving the assumption that Γ is bipartite.
4.2 Selfdual hypergraphs
A hypergraph C is called selfdual if it is dual to itself. Obviously, each such hypergraph generates a symmetric
tight game correspondence. The Fano projective plane provides an example:
C = {(o0, o1, o6), (o0, o2, o5), (o0, o3, o4), (o1, o2, o4), (o1, o3, o5), (o2, o3, o6), (o4, o5, o6)}.
o0o1o6 o0o2o5 o0o3o4 o1o2o4 o1o3o5 o2o3o6 o4o5o6
o0o1o6 o0o1o6 o0 o0 o1 o1 o6 o6
o0o2o5 o0 o0o2o5 o0 o2 o5 o2 o5
o0o3o4 o0 o0 o0o3o4 o4 o3 o3 o4
o1o2o4 o1 o2 o4 o1o2o4 o1 o2 o4
o1o3o5 o1 o5 o3 o1 o1o3o5 o3 o5
o2o3o6 o6 o2 o3 o2 o3 o2o3o6 o6
o4o5o6 o6 o5 o4 o4 o4 o6 o1o2o4
Figure 4. Game correspondence of the Fano plane.
To every pair of hypergraphs C and D defined on the same ground-set O, assign the hypergraph E =
{cC, dD, (c, d)}, where c and d are two new objects, c, d 6∈ O. To get E , we add c (resp., d) to each edge of C
(resp., of D) and also add one extra edge (c, d). Seymour noticed that C and D are dual if and only if E is
selfdual [28].
Let us define a large class of selfdual hypergraphs. Given p = k+1 ≥ 3 and the ground-set {o0, o1, . . . , ok},
the k-wheel is defined as the hypergraph
Wk = {(o0, o1), (o0, o2), . . . , (o0, ok), (o1, o2, . . . , ok)}.
It is easily seen that Wk is selfdual for any k ≥ 2.
Consider the following interpretation. Two players are choosing among k+1 options {o0, o1, . . . , ok}, where
o0 is a special one, which means that players did not come to an agreement. Each player has k + 1 strategies,
either to suggest an option, except o0, or to say “any”. The game correspondence is defined as follows:
• If they suggest oi and oj (recall that i, j ∈ {1, . . . , k}) then o0 is chosen when i 6= j and either o = oi = oj
or o0 is chosen when i = j.
• If one suggest oi, i = 1, . . . , k, while the other “any”, then oi is chosen.
• If both say “any” then each option, except o0, can be chosen.
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For k = 3 the game correspondence is given on the following table.
o0o1 o0o2 o0o3 o1o2o3
o0o1 o0o1 o0 o0 o1
o0o2 o0 o0o2 o0 o2
o0o3 o0 o0 o1o3 o3
o1o2o3 o1 o2 o3 o1o2o3
Figure 5. Game correspondence of the wheel, C = D =W3.
For each k ≥ 2, by Theorem 3, such game correspondence is NS. Moreover, we proved that a simple NE
exists for every payoff. This proof can be significantly simplified in the considered case.
Let player 1 (resp., 2) chooses his (her) best option oi (resp., oj) among o1, . . . , ok, while player 2 (resp., 1)
says “any”. Then oi (resp., oj) in the last column (resp., row) will be a simple NE unless o0 is better for the
opponent. We can assume that the latter holds for both players, since in all other cases we are done. If i 6= j
then the intersection of the row i and column j form a simple NE with the outcome o0. Interestingly, the most
difficult case is i = j, when the same option is the best for both. The corresponding diagonal entry is always a
NE with the outcome either o = oi = oj or o0, but this NE is not simple. Yet, the case is still simple. Indeed,
since o0 is the best option for both players, any simple strategy profile with the outcome o0 (and there exist
k(k − 1) of them) is a NE.
4.3 Symmetric dual hypergraphs
Let k and ℓ be two positive integers and C and D be symmetric hypergraphs of dimension k and ℓ on the
ground-set O = {o1, . . . , op} such that p = k + ℓ − 1. In other words, C (resp., D) consists of all k-subsets
(resp., ℓ-subsets) of O. It is well-known that C and D are dual; see, for example, [4, Part I Chapter 4].
A natural interpretation can be given in terms of veto voting. There are p candidates and two voters with
veto power p − k and p − ℓ; see [21, Chapter 6], [24, Chapter 6], or [8]. For k = 3 and ℓ = 2 the game
correspondence is given on the following table.
12 13 14 23 24 34
123 12 13 1 23 2 3
124 12 1 14 2 24 4
134 1 13 14 3 4 34
234 2 3 4 23 24 34
Figure 6. Game correspondence of the dual symmetric hypergraphs of dimensions k = 3 and ℓ = 2 on the
ground-set of size p = 4 represents veto voting with p = 4 candidates and n = 2 voters of the veto powers
p− k = 1 and p− ℓ = 2, respectively.
For any positive integer k and ℓ, a simple NE exists; see the proof of Theorem 3. It can be simplified in the
considered special case. Without loss of generality, we may assume that voter 1 prefers the candidates from O
in the order u1(o1) ≤ . . . ≤ u1(op) and, moreover, that all inequalities here are strict. He can veto k his worst
candidates and guarantee ok+1 or better. If the game is zero-sum, voter 2 just veto her ℓ worst candidates
O2 = {ok+2, . . . , op}. Obviously, these two strategies form a simple NE, electing the centrist ok+1.
If the game is not zero-sum then among ℓ candidates of O2 may exist r that are better than ok+1 for voter
2 (and for voter 1 as well. Note that r = 0 in the zero-sum case). Let us choose among these r candidates one
with the largest index, say, om; in other words, the best one for both voters. By construction, there are two
sets C,D ⊆ O such that |C| = k, |D| = ℓ, C ∩D = {om}, and om is better than any o ∈ C for voter 1 and any
o ∈ D for voter 2. Thus, strategy profile (C,D) forms a simple NE.
4.4 Jordan dual hypergraphs. Choosing Battlefields in Wonderland
Wonderland is a subset of the plane homeomorphic to the closed disc. Without loss of generality, one can
choose a square Q with the sides N,E, S,W , as in Figure 7. Let us partition Q into areas O = {o1, . . . , op}
each of which is homeomorphic to the closed disc, too. Any two distinct areas oi, oj ∈ O are either disjoint or
intersect in a set homeomorphic to a closed interval that contains more than one point. Equivalently, we can
require that the borders of the areas of O form a regular graph of degree 3, as in Figure 7.
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o5
o3 o4
o1 o2
W
N
E
S
o1o3 o2o4 o1o4o5 o2o3o5
o1o2 o1 o2 o1 o2
o3o4 o3 o4 o4 o3
o1o4o5 o1 o4 o1o4o5 o5
o2o3o5 o3 o2 o5 o2o3o5
Figure 7. The Jordan game correspondence of a map.
Two players, Tweedledee and Tweedledum, agreed to have a battle. The next thing to do is to choose a
battlefield, which should be an area o ∈ O. The strategies x ∈ X of Tweedledee (resp., y ∈ Y of Tweedledum)
are all inclusion-minimal subsets x ⊆ O (resp., y ⊆ O connecting N and S (resp., E and W ). The game
correspondence G : X × Y → O defined by the equality G(x, y) = x ∩ y ⊆ O will be called Jordan; see again
Figure 7 for an example. The following “topological” result is well-known.
Theorem 4 Any Jordan game correspondence G is well defined (that is, G(x, y) 6= ∅) and tight.
Proof. It is easily seen that any two pathes in Q, one connecting N with S and another connecting E with
W , intersect. This is one of the versions of the Jordan curve theorem. (Note that the claim fails when vertices
of degree larger than 3 are allowed in Q.) Hence, G(x, y) = x ∩ y 6= ∅ for any x and y. Moreover, it follows
from the same theorem that a subset of Q blocking all pathes between N and S must contain a path between
E and W , and vice versa. As we know, each of these two properties is equivalent with tightness of G. 
Thus, all results of Sections 2 and 3 related to NS follow. Let us note that in this case we do not know any
simpler way than to derive the existence of a simple NE from Theorem 3.
Remark 3 We required inclusion-minimality for the subsets x, y ∈ O just to reduce the number of strategies.
This requirement can be waved, but Theorem 4 with all its corollaries related to NS still hold.
5 Three-person monotone bargaining may be not tight and not NS
Let us introduce Claire to Alice and Bob and consider three sets of objects
A = {a1, . . . , am}, B = {b1, . . . , bn}, C = {c1, . . . , ck},
and the set of outcomes (or possible dealls) O = A×B × C.
The strategies of Alice, Bob, and Clair are all monotone non-decreasing mappings x : A → B, y : B → C,
and z : C → A. Given a triplet of strategies (x, y, z) ∈ X × Y × Z, naturally, a triplet of objects (a, b, c) ∈
A×B × C is called a deal if x(a) = b, y(b) = c, and z(c) = a).
Proposition 8 Every triplet (x, y, z) generates at least one deal.
Proof. We naturally assign to (x, y, z) a tripartite graph Γ = Γ(x, y, z) with the vertex-set V = A ∪B ∪ C
and all arcs (a, b), (b, c), and (c, a) such that x(a) = b, y(b) = c, and z(c) = a). Then, any initial vertex v0 ∈ V
uniquely defines a walk. Clearly, this walk is a lasso ending in a 3t-dicycle; moreover, t = 1 follows from the
fact that x, y, and z are monotone non-decreasing he mappings. 
Thus, G(x, y, z) 6= ∅ for all triplets (x, y, z) and we obtain a game correspondence G : X × Y × Z → 2O.
Yet, already for m = n = k = 2 the correspondence G2,2,2 in Figure 8 is not tight and not NS. Indeed, it is not
difficult to see that Alice’s and Bob-Claire’s hypergraphs
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HA = {(o111, o112, o121, o122), (o111, o121, o212, o222), (o211, o212, o221, o222)};
HBC = {(o111, o211), (o112, o212), (o111, o221), (o111, o222), (o112, o222), (o121, o221), (o121, o222)}.
are not dual. For example, (o121, o211) and (o121, o212) are transversal to HA that do not appear in HBC .
NS fails too, for example, for any utility u = (uA, uB , uC) such that
uA(212) > uA(222) > uA(111), uA(121) > uA(111), uA(122) > uA(112);
uB(112) > uB(111), uB(121) > uB(122), uB(222) > uB(221), uB(212) > uB(211);
uC(111) > uC(222), uC (122) > uC(122), uC (112) > uC(212), uC (221) > uC(121).
C A B C B C B C
A B
C A
A B
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C A
A B
oB111 o
B
111 o
A
112
oB111 o
B
111 o
A
112
oC121 o
B
122 o
B
122
oA111 o
A
111 o
C
212
oA111 o
A
111 o
A
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oC121 o
C
222 o
A
222
oB211 o
B
211 o
C
212
oB221 o
C
222 o
A
222
oB221 o
C
222 o
C
222
Figure 8. A monotone bargaining three person game game correspondence which is not tight and not NS,
In this figure 8, an upper index A,B, or C over a strategy profile (x, y, z), shows which player, Alice,
Bob, or Claire, could improve (x, y, z) by changing his/her strategy. Since each profile has an upper index,
we conclude that the game has no NE for any realization of the considered partially defined utility function
u = (uA, uB , uC).
Let us note that in the three-person case tightness and NS are no longer related. Tightness is neither
necessary nor sufficient for NS; see examples in [13] and [15].
Remark 4 In [13, Remark 3] it was mistakenly claimed that tightness is necessary for NS even in the n-person
case. This mistake was noticed by Danilov and corrected in [15].
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